


Training and Developing Army Leaders



**Lieutenant General William M. Steele, US Army,
Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth
and Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr., US Army**

General Shinseki chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to study training and leader development in light of Army Transformation and the new operational environment. As part of the Transformation process, the panel was asked to identify the characteristics and skills required for leaders of the transforming force. General Shinseki also tasked the panel to examine the current systems for training and leader development to see what changes would provide the best leaders for our Army and the best Army for our nation. The study was released 25 May.

THE 21ST CENTURY brings new challenges for Army leaders. Information is now a doctrinal element of combat power, and technologies associated with information offer the potential to change the way the Army wages war. Technology that provides real-time information throughout our combat formations is seen by many as our edge against industrial-age armies. But technology alone cannot provide the dominance required to win. The centerpiece of our formations remains quality leaders and their soldiers . . . not technology.

Technology is only a part of the equation. The more complex portion is leadership. The key to victory is the combination of information-age technology and capable leaders who enable the United States Army to dominate adversaries on full spectrum battlefields. Armed with better situational understanding, leaders can make bold, quick decisions

to solve complex problems. Changing missions and increased urban and complex terrain call for self-aware leaders who can operate and adapt across the full spectrum of operations. In today's operational environment, tactical actions by lieutenants, sergeants, corporals and their commanders can have strategic consequences with lasting impact on National policy. These demands highlight the need to assess our current training and leader development doctrine and programs to determine whether they will provide the leaders required for increasingly complex battlefields that are anticipated over the next 25 years.

More than a decade after the Cold War ended, the unitary, exclusive focus on fighting the Soviet Union is gone. US strategy and interests mandate an Army trained and ready for major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies and peacetime military engage-

ments. The foundation of this full spectrum credibility is our ability to dominate land combat. Our demonstrated warfighting ability enhances deterrence by allowing the National Command Authority to deter conflict and, when deterrence fails, to enter and dominate combat on our terms. Adversaries know they cannot win conventional, high intensity clashes with US forces, so the threat to Army forces is increasingly unconventional and asymmetric. Threats have ready access to off-the-shelf technologies that can confound our units and inflict casualties as much for political effect as for tactical advantage. Battles will migrate into urban and complex terrain where US standoff weapons offer few advantages and the proximity of noncombatants limits US firepower. The elusive threat in close, complex terrain will challenge our leaders and their soldiers as never before.

Technology continues to change the way the Army trains and operates. Increasingly lethal weapons and breakthroughs in command and control improve US forces' effectiveness, but not uniformly. Legacy, digital and Interim forces operating in the same area challenge commanders and staffs to combine their capabilities effectively. US forces lack a technological monopoly; even adversaries without a research and development capability can purchase remarkably sophisticated systems. Army leaders in this technology-rich environment must be able to adopt emerging capabilities and adapt them to their rapidly changing operational environment.

Success in full spectrum operations depends on leaders who consistently make better and faster decisions than their opponents, which means battle command education and training must evolve and expand. Materiel approaches and technological advances are only tools that leaders leverage. Commanders must visualize an expanded battle space; describe it clearly; direct soldiers, units and systems to accomplish their missions; and lead from the front. Understanding, confidence and trust between commanders and subordinates enable everyone to exploit opportunities, even in the absence of orders. Battle command in this new operational environment requires relevant operational and educational experiences to train and develop leaders. The emerging question is whether current Army training and leader development systems are adequate to produce leaders for these information-age battlefields.

The Army established its current training doctrine in 1987 to meet Cold War needs and described it in Field Manual (FM) 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused*

Threats have ready access to off-the-shelf technologies that can confound our units and inflict casualties as much for political effect as for tactical advantage. Battles will migrate into urban and complex terrain where US standoff weapons offer few advantages and the proximity of noncombatants limits US firepower.

Training. The doctrine's training principles and training management process have served the Army well. Today, a primary criticism concerning training doctrine is simply that leaders are not following the principles or the training management process. Increased taskings, high personnel tempo, excessive operational pace and unmanned units seriously degrade unit efforts to apply the doctrine. Solid training based on mission essential task lists (METL) competes with requirements for installation and community support, nonmission training and last minute taskings. The Red, Amber, Green training management process blurs and collapses when units are tasked regardless of their cycle. Unit training is top driven, not determined at the lowest tactical level, and the quarterly training brief has deviated from its doctrinal intent as a training contract with higher headquarters.

Changes in the operational environment, the National Military Strategy and force structure require the Army to reevaluate training doctrine and techniques. Fundamentally sound principles from current doctrine, such as standards-based METL training, assessments and feedback for leaders, units and the Army, should continue to provide the foundation for the next generation of training doctrine.


Like current training doctrine, Army leadership doctrine has roots more than a decade old. In a leader development study directed by General (GEN) Carl E. Vuono and completed in April 1988, GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, then Deputy Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College, concluded that the Army has two primary leader development tasks. First, the Army must develop leaders who can prepare the force for war. Second, the Army must develop leaders who can apply doctrine to win battles and campaigns. A key recommendation of the Sullivan Study was a formal Army leader development system. This system now includes a leader development model that

Figure 1.

A Century of Change

The Army Reviews and Transforms for the Future

Objective Force



Our leaders and their soldiers must be at the center of our Transformation efforts. Otherwise, we will remain focused on technology, platforms and weapon systems at the expense of Transformation's center-of-gravity . . . our people. Using technology, our leaders can dominate full spectrum battlefields, and developing those leaders is the best preparation for an uncertain future.

addresses the importance of institutional training and education, operational experience and self-development. Common doctrine-based standards for development and evaluation, such as officer Military Qualification Standards and soldier manuals are central features of today's Army Leader Development Model.

An Army looking toward the future must determine the best ways to train and develop leaders for full spectrum operations. From peacekeeping to preparing for war, our Army asks a great deal of leaders. As missions demand more of leaders, our training and leader development challenges increase. How should we adapt to these challenges?

The Army has always adopted a forward-looking attitude, and periodically we have sought self-reflection and self-assessment to measure our capabilities against future requirements. This has occurred about once per decade over the past century. Examples include Elihu Root's reforms in 1902, the National Defense Act of 1920, Lieutenant General (LTG) Leonard T. Gerow's and LTG Manton S. Eddy's boards, GEN William E. DePuy's and GEN Paul F. Gorman's reforms, GEN Don Starry's initiatives, GEN Vuono's training principles and training management process, and the Sullivan Study. Such introspection characterizes a true profession, and today's Army welcomes such self-examination.

On 1 June 2000, the Chief of Staff, US Army, (CSA), GEN Eric K. Shinseki, directed the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC), to convene an Army panel to review, assess and provide recommendations for developing and training our 21st-century leaders. The CSA designated CG, TRADOC, as the executive agent for the study and subsequently designated the CG, US Army Combined Arms Center, as the study director. GEN Shinseki chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to study training and leader development in light of Army Transformation and the new operational environment. While Transformation's



"Soldiers are the centerpiece of our formations."
Elements of the 92d MP Company respond to a mob in Kosovo.

Changing missions and increased urban and complex terrain call for self-aware leaders who can operate and adapt across the full spectrum of operations. In today's operational environment, tactical actions by lieutenants, sergeants, corporals and their commanders can have strategic consequences with lasting impact on National policy.

warfighting concepts, doctrine, force structures and materiel solutions have received most attention to date, the panel's review shifted our focus to leaders, soldiers and units as the "centerpiece of our formations." As part of the Transformation process, the panel was asked to identify the characteristics and skills required for officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO) and warrant officer leaders of this transformed force. GEN Shinseki also tasked the panel to examine current systems for training and leader development to see what changes would provide the best leaders for our Army and the best Army for our nation.

For the commissioned officer portion of the study, the ATLDP task organized four study groups, an integration team and a Red Team. The study groups comprised senior NCOs and company and field grade officers serving throughout the Army. Three study groups assessed the unit, institution and self-development pillars of the Army's Leader Development Model. A fourth study group examined Army culture as it relates to officer development, service ethic and retention. Senior officers, NCOs, civilian experts from industry and academia, and

GEN (Retired) Frederick M. Franks—our senior mentor—provided the panel with advice and direction. The integration team provided analytic, planning and logistic support. The Red Team provided real-time, critical review of the panel's process and findings. The panel's analytic process was thorough, concentrating on the specified and implied tasks directed by the CSA and CG, TRADOC. Members used comprehensive surveys, focus groups, personal interviews and independent research to compile data for analysis. Study groups traveled around the world and interviewed more than 13,500 Army leaders and their spouses. Most of those surveyed were lieutenants, captains and majors.

The ATLDP used a disciplined process to determine issues, collect data, form conclusions and make recommendations. Detailed mission analysis and investigation of the issues became the basis of survey instruments and field interviews. The broad sample from soldiers across the Army lends ultimate credibility to the panel's conclusions and recommendations. Input from the Army was informative, candid and heartfelt. As expected, leaders identified many strengths and weaknesses in our present

The ATLDP used a disciplined process to determine issues, collect data, form conclusions and make recommendations. Detailed mission analysis and investigation of the issues became the basis of survey instruments and field interviews. The broad sample from soldiers across the Army lends ultimate credibility to the panel's conclusions and recommendations. Input from the Army was informative, candid and heartfelt.


programs. Foremost among our strengths were the strong sense of service and commitment to the Nation and Army, the value of operational and educational experiences, the benefit of leadership opportunities and recognition that our combat training centers (CTCs) remain the crown jewels of Army training and leader development. The revealed weaknesses include an undisciplined operational pace; lack of senior-subordinate confidence and contact; micromanagement; personnel management; the Officer Efficiency Report (OER); validity of the current Officer Education System (OES); currency of training standards; resources for home station and CTC training; outdated training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS); and the lack of a sound training and leader development management system. The panel energetically discussed these and other issues and determined that several require immediate attention. They are so important and the need for change so significant, we considered them strategic imperatives. A brief synopsis of each follows.

Army culture. There is a strong relationship between Army culture and the quality of training and leader development programs. Army culture must operate routinely within an acceptable band of tolerance between what the Army expects of its leaders and what leaders expect from the Army. Any change that widens the gap between Army beliefs and practices threatens readiness, soldier and unit training, and leader growth. That widening gap between beliefs and practice leaves our Army culture out of balance. One pressure on the acceptable band of tolerance is micromanagement. Junior officers need opportunities to develop; they need commanders who trust them and are willing to underwrite mistakes. Additional tensions arise from the

undisciplined operational pace and an OER system and application yet to be accepted by our officer corps. Further, lieutenants want to be platoon leaders and lead soldiers, not serve in captain staff positions for which they are not trained. They are disappointed because they are rushed through developmental leadership positions and often do not have the opportunity to master tactical and technical leadership skills. When junior officers are quickly processed through key developmental positions, their expectations of leading soldiers are cut short. Unmet expectations and insufficient contact with battalion and brigade commanders reduce job satisfaction. Without early, quality tours leading soldiers, junior officers seriously consider other career opportunities—a retention concern for the Army.

Officer Education System. The OES does not train and educate officers in the skills they need for full spectrum operations. Schools should meet Army-directed accreditation and be staffed with our most professionally qualified instructors educating our least qualified officer students. The new operational environment emphasizes the need for joint operations. This translates to a necessity for joint education. Our OES provides Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I during the Com-

Figure 2. **Officer ATLDP Field Demographics**





10th Mountain Division soldiers line up on the tarmac to deploy (again).

A primary criticism concerning training doctrine is simply that leaders are not following the principles or the training management process. Increasing taskings, high personnel tempo, excessive operational pace and undermanned units seriously degrade unit efforts to apply the doctrine. Solid training based on METL competes with requirements for installation and community support, nonmission training and last minute taskings. The Red, Amber, Green training management process blurs and collapses when units are tasked regardless of their cycle.

mand and General Staff Officer Course, but access to the critical joint education provided during JPME Phase II is limited. The OES must adapt to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the operational environment. Largely untouched since the end of the Cold War and progressively underresourced during downsizing, the OES is not coordinated with Army needs. The OES requires a new approach that focuses each school on a central task and purpose; promotes officer bonding, cohesion, trust and life-long learning; links schools horizontally and vertically; synchronizes educational and operational experiences; and educates officers to common standards.

Training. Army training doctrine is fundamentally sound but must be adapted to reflect the new operational environment. Addi-

tionally, units cannot execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine because of undisciplined application of that doctrine and resource shortages. Our training system must be re-





Figure 4.

Strategic Implications

The Army is at a strategic decision point for training and leader development.

As the Army moves forward, training and leader development must be viewed together. They are interrelated, mutually supportive and inextricably linked.



Using technology, our leaders can dominate full spectrum battlefields, and developing those leaders is the best preparation for an uncertain future. The ATLDP has taken a self-generated, introspective review of our training and leader development programs. The entire Army participated in the officer portion of the study to provide credible conclusions and recommendations. A similar process will review warrant officer and noncommissioned officer programs this summer.

vitalized. Training doctrine needs to be updated, home station training improved and CTCs recapitalized and modernized. Training doctrine—FM 7-0 (25-100) and FM 7-10 (25-101)—must adapt to account for the new operational environment. This training doctrine must also be nested with doctrine in FM 3-0 (100-5), *Operations*, and FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*. In the meantime, commanders and units must adhere to existing training doctrine, principles and practices to help reduce operational pace and discipline training management. The Army must provide commanders with sufficient resources, including improved TADSS,

to improve home station training. Finally, the Army must recapitalize, modernize, staff and resource the CTCs to provide full spectrum, multi-echelon, combined arms training and leader development experiences.

Systems approach to training. We must return to standards-based training, the strength of Army readiness during post-Vietnam reforms. Standards served our Army well as we transformed from Vietnam to the Army of Excellence that fought *Desert Storm*. Standards-based training can do the same for our transforming Army today. While standards have been the basis for developing training, assessing performance and providing feedback, the systems approach designed to document and publish training standards has atrophied. The Army lacks training and education publications and standards for its Legacy and Interim forces. Without documented, accessible and digital standards, readiness among our soldiers, leaders and units will falter and endanger battlefield success.

Training and leader development model. The existing leader development model is outdated, and there is no training model. The Army needs a model that clearly shows leaders, staffs and outside agencies how training and leader development are interrelated and mutually supporting. This training and leader development model must emphasize Army culture; mandate standards for soldiers, leaders and units; provide feedback to leaders, units and the

Army; allow for self-development; balance operational and educational experience; and be founded on sound training and leader development principles. The model should produce self-aware, adaptive leaders, and trained and ready units. By focusing institutional education, guiding field training and advocating self-development, the model will describe a lifelong learning paradigm. It should also promote a mature management process that continually addresses training and leader development issues and provides feedback for the CSA.


Training and leader development management process. The Army has no management system for training or leader development, and without one, we risk losing sight of the reasons for change. An iterative, collaborative and comprehensive management process is needed to measure progress, adjust priorities and apply resources. Initially, this process should provide a quarterly CSA decision forum to build momentum, interest and enthusiasm for these programs throughout the Army.

Lifelong learning. Army culture underwrites leaders' commitment to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development to fill knowledge gaps. To be a learning organization that supports this lifelong learning the Army must:

- Provide training, education, standards and products for leader development.
- Provide doctrine, tools and support to foster lifelong learning.
- Provide balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.
- Develop and maintain a web-based Warrior Development Center that publishes standards, training and education publications, doctrinal manuals, assessment and feedback tools and provides dis-

Any change that widens the gap between Army beliefs and practices threatens readiness, soldier and unit training, and leader growth. That widening gap between beliefs and practice leaves our Army culture out of balance. One pressure on the acceptable band of tolerance is micromanagement. Junior officers need opportunities to develop; they need commanders who trust them and are willing to underwrite mistakes.

tance and distributed learning programs for self-development.

Leaders and soldiers must be at the center of our Transformation efforts. Otherwise, we will focus on technology, platforms and weapon systems at the expense of Transformation's center of gravity . . . our people. Using technology, our leaders can dominate full spectrum battlefields, and developing those leaders is the best preparation for an uncertain future. The ATLDP has taken a self-generated, introspective review of our training and leader development programs. The entire Army participated in the officer portion of the study to provide credible conclusions and recommendations. A similar process will review noncommissioned officer and warrant officer programs this summer. The officer study revealed the seven strategic imperatives outlined above. Detailed discussion, conclusions and recommendations regarding each imperative will be featured in the next issue of *Military Review*. 

Lieutenant General William M. Steele is the study director for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel. He is the commanding general, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His career includes six tours (more than 12 years) in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), during which he addressed training and leader development issues. He has commanded at every level from company through division and Army major command. His command and staff positions include commanding general, US Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii; director for operations, J3, US Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; commanding general, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; deputy commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; assistant division commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; assistant commandant, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; executive officer to the commanding general, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia; commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; and commander, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. His article "Army Leaders: How You Build Them, How You Grow Them" was published in the August 1992 Military Review.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr. is aide-de-camp for the commanding general, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the University of Maryland, an M.P.A. from Golden Gate University and an M.A. from Webster University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Korea, Persian Gulf, Haiti and Bosnia.